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The author of this unusual and fascinating monograph is an intellectual 
historian whose interests extend well beyond Nietzsche to encompass Weimar 
classicism, 20th century analytical psychology and classical Greek and Hellenistic 
philosophy. Although this may at first sound like a strange juxtaposition, Bishop’s 
previous studies have made a compelling case that vital aspects of Nietzsche’s 
thought come sharply into focus when he is read in relation to figures such as 
Goethe and Schiller on the one hand and Jung on the other, with an eye to certain 
formative themes and metaphors in the Platonic tradition. What we find when we 
set these thinkers in dialogue with one another is a distinct intellectual-spiritual 
lineage predominantly concerned with the possibilities of self-transformation. 
Bishop’s interpretative approach is perhaps closest to Pierre Hadot in this respect, 
albeit more oriented towards modern German thought and uniquely informed by 
Jungian depth psychology. 
      His latest book, On the Blissful Islands with Nietzsche and Jung, demonstrates 
effectively the kind of rich and resonant Nietzsche interpretation that can come 
from such a catholic approach.1 The exegetical scope of the study would initially 
appear rather modest, focusing on a short passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
which occurs at the end of the speech entitled “On the Blissful Islands”:  
 
Ah, you men, I see an image sleeping in the stone, the image of my visions! Ah 
that it must sleep in the hardest, ugliest stone! 
 Now my hammer rages fiercely against its prison. Fragments fly from 
the stone: what is that to me? 
																																																								
1	It should be noted that this book is just as much a study of Jung as it is a study of 






 I will complete it: for a shadow came to me—the most silent, the lightest 
of all things once came to me!  
 The beauty of the Superman came to me as a shadow. Ah, my brothers! 
What are the gods to me now! (Z II.2)2 
 
Bishop pays especially close attention to a number of ideas here: the classical myth 
of the Blissful Islands, the soteriological function of the statue and project of 
(self-)sculpting, the protean metaphor of the shadow, the beautiful but elusive 
ideal of the Superman. In order to elucidate them he provides a “comparative, 
associationist, and amplificatory” reading à la Jung (xx), which gradually winds its 
way through a staggeringly wide range of intertexts: the Torah, the New 
Testament, various Platonic dialogues, a healthy slab of Neoplatonic treatises, 
works of Patristic theology and medieval Christian mysticism, an assortment of 
Gnostic, Hermetic, Kabbalistic and alchemical texts, select poems by Schiller and 
Goethe, Jung’s voluminous psychological studies (including his five year-long 
seminar on Zarathustra), and a smattering of twentieth-century philosophers 
(Bergson, Klages, Cassirer, etc). Bishop’s premise is not that Nietzsche somehow 
had all this neatly in mind as he composed Zarathustra: while there are obvious 
references to the Bible, Plato, Schiller and Goethe, it’s safe to say he was entirely 
unfamiliar many of these texts. Rather, the idea seems to be that some of the most 
powerful themes, images and metaphors of that book can be traced back through 
various strands of the tradition and have a kind of logic of their own that is 
reactivated in Nietzsche’s writing, regardless of his presumed intentions. In this 
way, Bishop ensnares Nietzsche with dozens of fine literary threads and pulls him 
back into close dialogue with ways of thinking and living that he is usually believed 
to have repudiated—and that contemporary philosophy is typically supposed to 
have left behind.  
      The first chapter, “On the Blissful Islands: In the Shadow of the Superman” 
focuses on Zarathustra’s puzzling assertion that “[t]he beauty of the Superman 
came to me as a shadow.” Why a shadow? What is the significance of that image? 
Bishop’s initial attempt at an answer unfolds into a sprawling, nearly 80 page-long 
consideration of this symbol across multiple texts and traditions. He surveys the 
significance of the shadow throughout ancient Greek cultures and provides a 
fascinating treatment of comparable imagery in the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
																																																								
2  Bishop employs R. J. Hollingdale’s 1969 translation, which for all its strengths is 
arguably a bit dated. For the sake of simplicity, however, I will abide by those translation 
choices here.  
 




from the “overshadowing” of Mary in the Annunciation to the darkness 
associated with God in Torahic theophanies and mystical texts (a function, 
ultimately, of God’s brilliant ontological radiance). Figuring most prominently in 
this discussion, however, is Jung’s archetypal notion of the shadow as the ‘dark’ 
aspect of one’s self: the seemingly inferior, worthless, repressed or rejected 
characteristics that one cannot acknowledge or affirm, and which consequently 
reemerge as projected demonizations of the other. While Jung identifies in 
Nietzsche’s thought (as well as Freud’s) a refreshing willingness to recognize the 
“black substance” out of which all radiant things must necessarily emerge, he 
suggests that Zarathustra struggles to affirm his own shadow and thus repeatedly 
externalizes it (he interprets the parade of grotesque characters one finds there—
the fire-dog, the Soothsayer, the Dwarf, the black snake, the Ape, the Ugliest Man, 
etc—as products of Zarathustra’s shadow-forming process).3 And of course, one 
can see Nietzsche himself struggle with this through his doctrine of amor fati: “to 
see as beautiful what is necessary in things” (GS 276). On this account, as long as 
the self refuses to bring all parts of itself together, even its imperfections, 
shortcomings and humiliating inadequacies (“the enemy . . .  in [one’s] own heart,” 
as Jung aptly puts it), it cannot achieve wholeness. Bishop clearly traces this idea 
back through German classicism to Neoplatonic aesthetics, emphasizing the 
essential connection between beauty and totality. Along the way, he examines 
some interesting subsidiary anticipations of Jung’s complementaristic vision, e.g. 
in the 16th century alchemical text Rosarium philosophorum and Goethe’s pivotal 
poem “Blessed Yearning” (Selige Sehnsucht).   
      Taken as a whole, this first lengthy chapter is a remarkable display of scholarly 
attentiveness and crackles with suggestive associations. Yet one can’t help but 
wonder what the punchline is. Bishop points out in the conclusion that 
“Nietzsche’s imagery in ‘On the Blissful Islands’ is extraordinarily rich in its 
intertextual and iconographic references and there are enormous associations at 
play when we read that the Superman came to Zarathustra as a shadow” (62). Surely 
this has been well demonstrated, but the original question hasn’t ultimately been 
addressed: why does the beauty of the Superman come to Zarathustra as a shadow? 
																																																								
3  Jung is more circumspect about identifying the Shadow himself (IV.9) as one of 
Zarathustra’s shadows. Although Bishop offers a lengthy Jungian analysis of the Ugliest 
Man (Z IV.7), he does not have much to say here about the last human being (Z P.4) or 
the small human being (Z III.13.2), but affirmation of such realities would presumably 







Instead of answering it—perhaps by concisely synthesizing the aforementioned 
play of associations—Bishop closes out the chapter by continuing to tease out 
and elaborate upon contrasting metaphors and themes. The reader is thus left 
with a superabundance of intriguing literary and philosophical resonances, but no 
clear sense of how they might illuminate the passage in question.  
      Chapter 2 is more fully realized. Titled after Plotinus’ famous precept, “Never 
cease chiseling your statue” (Enneads, I.6.9), it focuses on the central image of Z 
II.2: Zarathustra as sculptor, liberating the Superman from the hard, ugly stone 
of humanity. Here Bishop takes a close look at the metaphors of sculpting and 
the statue in Greco-Roman philosophy and the Judeo-Christian religious 
traditions, tracing the image up through the Renaissance, Enlightenment, and 
Weimar Classicism to Nietzsche and beyond. Interestingly, there is initially more 
resistance to the idea of the statue in the Judeo-Christian tradition, due to the 
Mosaic prohibition against graven images (rooted, arguably, in the transcendence 
and thus imperceptibility of God; cf. the theme of darkness mentioned above). 
While in some Presocratic thought there is a comparable hesitancy about 
attempting to represent the divine, pagan Greek thought generally exhibits a more 
positive attitude toward the theurgic and moral functions of the statue. As Bishop 
points out, “over time [its] significance shifts and the statue becomes an exemplar, 
not so much of idolatry, as of autonomous creativity” (93). His grouped 
discussion of Seneca, Plotinus, Gregory of Nyssa, Pseudo-Dionysius the 
Areopagite and Meister Eckhart is particularly illuminating in this respect: we see 
an increasing concern with the sculpting or fashioning of the self (which 
Nietzsche will enthusiastically retrieve) and the Neoplatonic influence on 
Christian thinkers leads them to conceive of prophets and even God as a sculptor 
of human beings (96-97). The Neoplatonic conception of sculpting as a kind of 
purification, clearing aside or taking away remains influential through the 
Renaissance period, epitomized by Michelangelo’s famous remark, “I saw the 
angel in the marble and carved him until I set him free.” All this provides a useful 
background against which to read Nietzsche’s own ambitious language of 
sculpting (both of self and other, as well as individual and type).  
      Bishop does a fine job of interrogating the salient passages and he is well-
attuned to the radically different axiological and ontological commitments that 
underlie Nietzsche and the Neoplatonists’ respective projects.4 But I wonder 
																																																								
4 Bishop surveys the obligatory passages alongside Z II.2 (BT 1, KSA 9:7[213], Z II.20, 
BGE 225), as well as some less familiar but very suggestive ones (HH 258, AOM 172, 
GS 12, EH, “Wise,” 2), although he does omit a couple of crucial ones (GS 290, BGE 
62).  




whether the question of human self-sculpture in the aftermath of the death of 
God might be brought even more sharply into focus by explicitly considering the 
Platonic ideal of homoiōsis theōi (becoming like god), which seems to hover in the 
background of much of the early philosophical sculpture literature. The theme is 
enormously important in Greek and Hellenistic philosophy and it gets taken up 
and thought through quite thoroughly in an Abrahamic context by a host of 
Islamic and Jewish thinkers during the medieval period. It might prove a useful 
foil for understanding the inherent tensions in Zarathustra’s experimental 
cultivation of the Superman, since (1) he adopts and retains the Neoplatonic 
assumption that sculpting is essentially removal of the inessential, yet (2) there is 
no preexisting paradigm or telos to be discovered or revealed, and (3) he speaks 
both here and elsewhere of the “completion” or “perfection” (Vollkommenheit) of 
the human being. Be that as it may, we are deeply indebted to Bishop for having 
explored the motif of self-sculpture so thoroughly, and one’s reading of 
Zarathustra (and Nietzsche’s corpus in general) cannot but be much richer as a 
result of it. 
      At the very end of Chapter 2, Bishop observes that the appeal to embark on 
a path of self-transformation implies dissatisfaction with the current shape of 
things. “But does wanting something else—or wanting something better—imply 
one believes there can actually be something better?” he asks, “Or that there is 
something one could call the best? Does it imply one believes in something that 
might be called—the ideal . . . ?” (129). This question sets the stage for Chapter 3, 
which attempts to synthesize the shadow and sculpting themes. Bishop 
approaches this through a close reading of Schiller’s poem “The Ideal and Life” 
(Das Ideal und das Leben), which attends to its developmental history as well as its 
thematic relation to a projected (albeit unwritten) subsequent poem on Heracles’ 
arrival, divine transfiguration and joyful blessedness in Olympus. The central 
theme of the poem, which Bishop brings to bear on Zarathustra, is the perpetual 
accessibility of the ideal amidst the struggle and strife of life, via both intellectual 
contemplation and aesthetic creativity. While this may at first seem like an escapist 
fantasy, he emphasizes the ideal’s capacity to invigorate and transform life in the 
here and now. The transfiguration of the present moment by means of “the 
eternal within,” he calls it, leads into an extended reflection on the meaning of 
the Blissful Islands (glückseligen Inseln).  
      This is a welcome contribution to the literature, since the theme of the Blissful 
Islands in Zarathustra has not as yet received any sustained treatment. Bishop lays 







examines its roots in classical Greek myth as the place of the heroic dead and 
traces the idea in its various permutations through Hesiod, Homer, Pindar, Plato, 
Virgil, Plutarch, Pliny the Elder and the 6th c. Neoplatonist Olympiodorus. Often 
conceived as a paradisiacal afterlife, sometimes as an actual place in the world 
where life is easiest and best, the Blissful Islands represent the idyllic possibility 
of genuine blessedness or happiness. In Chapter 3, Bishop fuses this with the 
invigorating and transformative capacity of the ideal in the midst of life and finds 
in Schiller and Nietzsche an “insistence on the possibility, in the here-and-now, 
of happiness or joy” (172). Ultimately, the Blissful Islands are “[e]xactly where 
you are right now”—hence Zarathustra’s insistence in Z IV.2 that “There are still 
Blissful Islands!” (173). Wherever one is, there is always the possibility of joy, or 
put differently, the manifestation of eternity, completeness and perfection in the 
present moment.  
      Bishop’s consideration of this theme in Nietzsche is rewarding, even inspiring, 
and I have to admire any scholar who can work a good Laurie Anderson quote 
into a discussion of Nietzsche, Schiller, and Greek myth (173). But there are 
several stones still left unturned here. For the Blissful Islands, at least in 
Zarathustra, constitute an actual place. Why do Zarathustra’s friends leave the 
Motley Cow to take up residence there in Z II.1? Why does Zarathustra abandon 
them in Z II.22?5 Why does the Soothsayer claim in Z IV.2 that “there are no 
Blissful Islands anymore”? Why are there multiple rejected drafts in the Nachlass 
that intimate the sinking and destruction of the Blissful Islands? One is tempted 
here to consult biographical details: for instance, Nietzsche’s admission to Peter 
Gast that Zarathustra’s Blissful Islands were inspired by Ischia, an island in the 
Gulf of Naples, or his mourning of their destruction in the summer 1883.6 Even 
then, though, their philosophical significance in the context of Zarathustra remains 
unclear. My own view is that the Blissful Islands represent a kind of Epicurean 
friendship community that captures in nuce Nietzsche’s own shift from the more 
modest project of private self-cultivation exemplified in his middle works to the 
nomothetic (and markedly Platonic) ambitions of Zarathustra and his later period. 
I also think a closer attention to the language of ‘blessedness’ in the Greek and 
German traditions generally and Zarathustra specifically (makariotēs, Seligkeit, 
																																																								
5 Zarathustra himself offers multiple rationales in Z II.22, III.1, III.3; cf. Z II.9 and KSA 
10:16[89]. 
6 Bishop acknowledges these facts but doesn’t bring them to bear on his interpretation 
of the text (4-5). For a more detailed biographical discussion of the significance of Ischia 
for Nietzsche, see Paolo D’Iorio, Nietzsche’s Journey to Sorrento: Genesis of the Philosophy of the 
Free Spirit (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2016). 




Glückseligkeit, etc) would have been constructive. But Bishop’s take on this theme 
is resourceful and thought-provoking, and it has certainly fine-tuned the way I 
think about it. 
      The fourth and final chapter of the book begins by surveying Platonic, 
Nietzschean and Jungian attitudes towards the body. Bishop offers a nuanced and 
sympathetic reading of select Platonic and Neoplatonic texts that undermines the 
usual assumption that they are anti-body. Similarly, a historical-developmental 
examination of the concept of spirit (Geist) complicates Nietzsche’s materialism. 
But the heart of the chapter is a sustained reflection on the relation between 
asceticism and ecstasy.7 Bishop quickly moves beyond the usual two-dimensional 
platitudes about Nietzsche’s critique of the ascetic ideal to examine his subtler 
and more ambivalent attitude towards spiritual exercises. By situating 
Zarathustra’s ecstatic experiences of dancing, ascent and celebratory world-
affirmation (as well as some of Nietzsche’s more confessional passages) against 
the background of ascetic practices, Bishop offers us a portrait of Nietzsche as a 
‘mystic’ or initiate of sorts, which I find both compelling and plausible (setting 
aside the simplistic modern caricatures that have obscured the original meanings 
of that term). The book winds down with a discussion of some other affinities 
between the Nietzschean and Platonic worldview (e.g, the centrality of hierarchy 
and the idea of the world as ‘perfect’) and concludes with one last elegant 
reflection on the significance of the Blissful Islands.8 
      There are respects in which Bishop’s book is unusual, and some may take 
exception to the liberties he allows himself. The “comparative, associationist, and 
amplificatory” approach to texts that he employs here can be exciting and 
suggestive, but also occasionally scattershot, slippery and exhausting.9 And Jung, 
from whom Bishop derives this hermeneutic strategy, has for some time had a 
checkered reputation in academia (both in the social sciences and the humanities). 
																																																								
7 As Bishop points out, the question of the relation between asceticism and ecstasy was 
one of the things that led Jung to part ways with Freud (192).  
8 I take Bishop’s emphasis on the “Platonic” aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy to be part 
of an encouraging trend away from the simplistic traditional oppositions often posited 
between these thinkers; cf. Horst Hutter, Shaping the Future: Nietzsche’s New Regime of the 
Soul and Its Ascetic Practices (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), Mark Anderson, Plato 
and Nietzsche: Their Philosophic Art (London: Bloomsbury, 2014) and Laurence Lampert, 
What a Philosopher Is: Becoming Nietzsche (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2018). 
9 On a more picayune note, I encountered a number of citational inconsistencies and 
repetitions, as well as a few references to The Will to Power which ought instead to have 
been to the KSA. But minor flaws like this are simply attributable to sloppy editorial 





I set aside the question whether this is entirely justified, but will say that I find 
Bishop’s inclusive attitude refreshing and am glad to see Jung discussed in 
responsible scholarly contexts, placed in relation to thinkers such as Nietzsche, 
Schiller, Goethe and Plotinus and embraced as a significant moment in the lineage 
of modern German thought. Similarly, I admired Bishop’s ability to set Nietzsche 
in productive dialogue with these thinkers about abiding practical concerns that 
bear on the art of living. Those whose tastes lean towards reconstructions of 
Nietzsche’s thought into some contemporary ‘ism’ may find this book 
inadequately systematic. Those who insist on rigorous historical contextualization 
of Nietzsche’s thought and enumerating precisely what he did or didn’t read may 
find it too loose and speculative. I myself found it fascinating and stimulating. I 
very much appreciated the broad historical scope, the generous engagement with 
liminally philosophical texts, and the practical emphasis self-sculpting and 
transformation. In the spirit of both Goethe and Nietzsche, this is a book that 
does not merely aim to instruct, but also to augment and invigorate one’s activity.  
 
 
